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‘High time’ EU gets observer status: UK

General,

This article originally appeared in The Circle, WWF’s quarterly Arctic journal, issue 01.16. See all articles here. Previous issues of The Circle can be downloaded here.
arctic-tern-uk
Gone are the days of the 19th and early 20th century when Britain’s Royal Navy ruled the seven seas and saw itself as   the world’s peacekeeper through flying the flag or – on occasion – using its gunboat diplomacy. Also gone are the days when British explorers were among the few that first mapped the most remote and inhospitable regions of our planet. While the balances of power have changed, as LORD ROBIN TEVERSON points out, geography has not. Teverson is a Liberal Democrat politician in the British parliament’s House of Lords.
BRITAIN IS STILL the nearest neighbouring non-Arctic state. The northernmost tip of the British Isles, the Shetland Island’s ‘Out Stack’ or Oosta, is a mere 320 nautical miles south of the Arctic Circle. The Arctic remains a part of the UK’s backyard. What happens there – climate change, pollution, security, shipping routes, or territorial claims – has a knock-on effect on British interests.
This is why the House of Lords took the decision in 2014 to set up a select committee to scrutinise the Government’s policies for the High North. We set about our task by taking evidence in parliament while members visited the Yukon, Iceland, Tromsø and Svalbard.
The impetus for our enquiry was one of change. The Arctic is the region of greatest transformation on our planet – the fastest rising temperatures, melting ice, increasing mineral exploration, the start of mass tourism, and opening sea routes.
From a diplomatic point of view, Britain may still be a major player in research and an observer at the Arctic Council. However, its historic activity is at risk of being eclipsed by the welcome interest of more distant nations, not least from Asia.
As the committee undertook its  work it also became clear that the UK had wider interests in the High North: London is a global centre of business, finance and insurance; it is the headquarters of the International Maritime Organisation and OSPAR (the Convention for the Protection of the Marine Environment of the North-East Atlantic); we have a long history of polar science and expertise from the North Sea on gas exploration.
The British Government produced its own Arctic policy document in 2013. It was cautiously called a ‘policy framework’ – avoiding the word ‘strategy’ so as not to be seen as too bold. But did this reticence risk sending out a signal of indifference to the rest of the world?
That same year the Arctic Council expanded the number of its observer states with the admission of China, India, Japan, South Korea, Singapore and Italy. Instead of being one of four original observer states, the UK was now one of twelve.
Our recommendations were wide ranging:

  • the UK should appoint an Arctic Ambassador to coordinate the UK’s North Polar activities and raise our northern game
  • there should be a moratorium on fishing in Arctic international waters until the ocean’s ecology is far better understood
  • the UK’s contribution to polar research should be increased, especially regarding permafrost thaw
  • the fall in oil prices should be an opportunity to pause offshore exploration to resolve the very real environmental dangers.
  • the Arctic Council should continue to receive the full support of the UK in its work as a successful regional organisation of governance
  • the USA should ratify the UNCLOS treaty (the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Seas) that will determine the many territorial claims around the Pole
  • the UK should work to help isolate other wider geopolitical problems. The Crimean annexation took place during the work of the committee but Arctic cooperation needs to continue despite wider tensions.

There were many other recommendations, not least supporting the robust involvement of the Indigenous peoples of the Arctic. But we also strongly recommended that the European Union should at last be given full observer status at the Arctic Council.
It could be argued that with Denmark, Sweden and Finland as full members of the Council, and seven other EU states as observers, it is hardly necessary. But the EU is a major supranational power that can act as an important coordinator of external action: it has one of the world’s largest research budgets and it is a key player in fisheries management in northern waters adjoining the Arctic. The EU has been an ‘ad hoc’ observer since 1998. The move to a permanent official role has been soured by the dispute with Canada over seal products. Now that this has been resolved, it is the EU’s robust reaction to Russia’s intervention in Ukraine that is proving to be the barrier.
There is no doubt that the EU as a fully-fledged observer would be beneficial to the Arctic’s future and strengthen the Arctic Council itself. The Arctic Council is young in terms of international organisations and has  a good track record of success. It is in the interest of all countries, including the UK, that the Council increases its authority and is successful as the Arctic undergoes continued rapid change.

Piloting the Arctic passages

General,

This article originally appeared in The Circle, WWF’s quarterly Arctic journal, issue 01.16. See all articles here. Previous issues of The Circle can be downloaded here.

The Canadian icebreaker ship Louis St. Laurent, breaking through the sea ice of the Canada Basin, Beaufort Sea, Alaska, United States. © Paul Nicklen/National Geographic Stock / WWF-Canada

The Canadian icebreaker ship Louis St. Laurent, breaking through the sea ice of the Canada Basin, Beaufort Sea, Alaska, United States. © Paul Nicklen/National Geographic Stock / WWF-Canada


Melting sea ice is reviving the centuries-old dream of an Arctic “silk route” connecting European or North American ports to Asia. With navigating the Arctic becoming a reality, MARIA DELIGIANNI says European shipowners need more investments in infrastructure and technology. Deligianni is a Policy Advisor on Maritime Safety, Environment and Offshore at European Community Shipowners’ Associations (ECSA).
PRECAUTIONS NEED to be taken to ensure safety of life at sea and the sustainability of these highly sensitive environments is not compromised. While the International Maritime Organisation (IMO) remains the primary regulator for the shipping industry, the European Community Shipowners’ Associations (ECSA) endorses the actions taken by the European Union towards the development of a policy on Arctic issues, especially in increasing knowledge of the region and investing in research and development. The Polar Code was intensely debated by the IMO for more than four years before adoption in 2014 by its Maritime Safety Committee (MSC). From the beginning European shipowners underscored that a mandatory and uniform regulatory framework is a prerequisite to ensure maritime safety and environmental protection, as polar shipping grows in volume and diversifies in the coming years. This is the single, most expeditious solution to achieve coordination and harmonisation of national legislation.
As European Shipowners, we support that the risk-based approach followed by the Polar Code will indeed boost the level of confidence in the safety and environmental performance of shipping. As of 2017, we are set to comply with IMO requirements by carrying onboard the Polar Ship Certificate stating the adequacy of the vessel to navigate in the region and the Polar Water Operational Manual – an essential tool in evaluating the anticipated range of operating conditions and hazards to ensure the decision-making process onboard is adjusted accordingly.
The Code has been criticized for a number of omissions on issues such as heavy fuel oil use by vessels, the lack of invasive species’ protections and sufficient oil spill response requirements. We consider the Polar Code to be the first decisive step by the IMO at this stage. The importance of the Code is its mandatory nature that ensures a level playing field. However, we acknowledge that more needs to be done and anticipate amendments will follow to strengthen the current provisions.
It is unrealistic to believe that the Arctic will be immediately accessible as sea ice disappears. Firstly, an ice-free Arctic Ocean year-round is false, as sea ice will always re-form during winter and ice properties and coverage will vary greatly within the region. There are also many other challenges that shipowners encounter such as polar darkness, poor charts, lack of critical infrastructure and navigation control systems, low search-and-rescue capability, and other non-climatic factors.
Therefore, development of the appropriate regulatory framework should be accompanied by reinforced infrastructure and technology. Other critical investments include: improved navigation aids; accuracy of nautical charts; weather forecasts; monitoring of drifting ice and icing conditions as well as search and rescue infrastructure for defined incident scenarios. These are just some of the critical factors that need to be addressed in a region in which extreme weather events are routine occurrences.
Maintaining a positive reputation for operators, as the area is increasingly exploited, is also a challenge. Maritime transport and energy extraction depend on both local and global acceptance of increased industrial activity in the Arctic. Investment in relationships is imperative for local and global acceptance of increasing industrial activities in the Arctic. This confidence can be built through investments in ice research, forecasting and communications to ensure operational risks can be properly assessed and mitigated. A broad focus on knowledge and research is also crucial for increasing activities in the Arctic.
As demonstrated by the successful development of the Polar Code, IMO is the appropriate forum for developing standards for ships operating in the Arctic. It has the necessary legal and technical expertise to take full account of the interests of all maritime nations, including those with an Arctic coastline.
Discussions on an EU Policy on arctic issues are also gaining momentum. In principle, we endorse the three pillars identified by the 2012 Joint Communication Commission and High Representative of the EU for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy: support research and channel knowledge; act with responsibility; and intensify the constructive engagement and dialogue with Arctic States. We also acknowledge EU’s actions in becoming one of the key investors in the region by exploring further investment and research priorities.
The EU could play a prominent role in addressing some of these challenges through the development of satellite communication and tracking and monitoring systems to ensure safe navigation and enable search and rescue (SAR) operations. This could take place through Galileo and Copernicus, the global navigation satellite system which provides a highly accurate, global positioning service.
In addition, a highly-developed infrastructure of geographical information through the creation of a digital atlas of the Arctic should be established. Compiling geographical information and obtaining a complete picture of what is happening at a given location (maps, charts, records, etc.) is also crucial. This data should be collected, maintained and made available in the most effective manner, perhaps through the Arctic Information Center the European Commission is considering.
The EU could also develop a platform to pool data on the state of the seas in and around Europe and high-resolution sea-bed mapping. This would further assist in establishing safe transport routes in Arctic waters.
Last but not least, it is clear that future initiatives in the Arctic will necessitate an increase in maritime training capacity. Specialised courses focusing on High North/Arctic operations should be enhanced to offer relevant and qualified manpower in the offshore and maritime domain. Improved competence requirements and standards will ensure there is knowledge and understanding of Arctic conditions. The EU could play a prominent role in developing these programmes.
Shipping activities in the Arctic must take place within the framework of uniform regulatory framework and adequate infrastructure that ensures quality shipping among all operators in the region. Any maritime accident in the vulnerable Arctic is an accident that affects us all.

What’s the EU’s place in the Arctic?

General,

This article originally appeared in The Circle, WWF’s quarterly Arctic journal, issue 01.16. See all articles here. Previous issues of The Circle can be downloaded here.
ice-bear-in-copenhagen
GENEVIÈVE PONS is the Director of the European Policy Office of WWF.
THE ARCTIC IS STREWN with the names of Europeans drawn by the lure of trade and riches – Dutch explorer Willem Barentsz, Dane Vitus Bering, Britain’s William Baffin, for example and there are hundreds more. Close behind them came fur traders, whalers, gold-seekers and others who left a legacy of Indigenous oppression and devastating ecological impacts.

This time, the people of the Arctic are better prepared to defend their rights and interests

After a couple of centuries of relative neglect, the Arctic is once again drawing Europeans and for many of the same reasons. At the same time, the region is at the very centre of debates on climate change as it warms twice as fast as the global average and drives global impacts such as rising sea levels and melting sea ice which is opening up the Arctic Ocean and spurring renewed interest in Arctic resources and trade routes.
This time, however, the rule of international law is more entrenched in the Arctic, and the people of the Arctic are better prepared to defend their rights and interests.
As I write this, the European Commission is preparing to release a “communication” that is expected to officially set out the EU’s interests in the Arctic in the coming years. WWF provided input to this process that we hope will be reflected in this upcoming policy paper.
For example, WWF has recommended more research  to help understand and predict Arctic change, particularly regarding ecosystems, the sustainability of fisheries and the transition from fossil fuels (especially diesel) to renewables for energy production. This should go hand-in-hand with support for investments in alternative socio- economic models fostering economic diversification into sectors other than extractive industries.
The EU should also provide political support for nature conservation in the region, and for the creation and management of a pan-Arctic network of protected areas, including areas of particular ecological importance in terms of climate change resilience, communities and species conservation.
Wildlife products have long provided livelihoods for Arctic Indigenous peoples, and it is important to ensure that their use and trade is based on sustainable practices.The EU can do much to educate consumers on wildlife products, perhaps through certification schemes.
The EU should also enforce compliance of European businesses operating in the Arctic with international, EU and national regulations, as well as with Arctic-specific standards and guidelines to address marine noise, oil spill prevention, pollution, carbon intensity, and fisheries.
As well, many internationally agreed goals such as limiting global temperature rise to well below 2C, halting global biodiversity loss by 2020, and establishing marine protected areas, will benefit the Arctic region, given its unique exposure to climate change and nature degradation.
This time around, the people of the EU can explore the Arctic’s potential more ethically and sustainably than they did centuries ago. Instead of leaving their names on the map, they can leave a legacy of support for the Arctic environment, and for Arctic peoples.

The European Parliament & EU Arctic policy

General,

This article originally appeared in The Circle, WWF’s quarterly Arctic journal, issue 01.16. See all articles here. Previous issues of The Circle can be downloaded here.
The European Union may have a relatively small territory above the Arctic Circle but FERNANDO GARCES DE LOS FAYOS says it has always been an important and engaged Arctic actor. In terms of Arctic research he notes the EU, along with the EU Member States, is one of the leading forces in the world. He argues that the Union works hard to encourage international research collaboration with its sectoral policies, and its cross-border actions have a significant impact on the Arctic region. FERNANDO GARCES DE LOS FAYOS is a Senior parliamentary policy analyst with the European Parliament.
THE EU ARCTIC POLICY has been built gradually since 2008 in a process that is still ongoing. From the outset, the EU Arctic policy was meant to be a common enterprise of the EU institutions and the EU Member States, open to inputs from other Arctic States and other Arctic stakeholders. Its first building block, the 2008 European Commission Communication on the EU and the Arctic, was the result of a vast consultation exercise. A second Communication in 2012 consolidated the EU Arctic policy, maintaining three basic priorities:

  • support research and channel knowledge to address environmental challenges, most notably climate change in the Arctic;
  • act with responsibility to assist in ensuring economic development in the Arctic is based on sustainable use of resources and environmental expertise;
  • intensify its constructive engagement and dialogue with Arctic States, Indigenous peoples and other partners.

The European Parliament (EP) has agreed with this basic line and has provided valuable input into the construction of the EU’s Arctic policy. On top of regular questioning of the European Commission and the European External Action Service (EEAS) whilst reflecting Arctic concerns in the work of its different Committees, three key resolutions have channelled the main views of the EP on Arctic policy, i.e. 9 October 2008, 29 September 2011 and 12 March 2014. The latter EP resolution (2014), along with the Council of the EU Conclusions of 12 May 2014, asks for a new Communication, taking into account the recent developments in the Arctic and in EU action in the Arctic.
The EP went a step further asking for the new document to be a proper EU strategy for the Arctic region, in line with the national Arctic strategies of EU Arctic and non-Arctic Member States. The new Communication was expected by the end of last year but it has still not been issued at the time of writing (mid-January 2016), probably because the text needs to reflect the achievements and new avenues opened up by the 21st Conference of the Parties of the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCC) held in Paris in December, 2015.
The EP is eager to see how the new Communication reflects the recommendations that it called for in its 2014 Resolution. Several of these recommendations refer to Arctic Indigenous Peoples and other citizens living in the Arctic. The European Parliament:

  • emphasises that the EU must take into account the need for raw material activities to provide local benefits and garner good will with the Arctic populations;
  • urges the Commission to proceed with the establishment of an ‘EU Arctic Information Centre’;
  • recommends strengthening regular exchange and consultations on Arcticrelated topics with regional, local and Indigenous stakeholders of the European Arctic in order to facilitate mutual understanding;
  • stresses that maintaining developed and sustainable communities in the Arctic with a high quality of life is of the utmost importance, and that the EU can play a vital role in the matter;
  • acknowledges the wish of the inhabitants and governments of the Arctic region, with sovereign rights and responsibilities, to continue to pursue sustainable economic development while at the same time, protecting the traditional sources of the Indigenous peoples’ livelihoods and the very sensitive nature of Arctic ecosystems. The EP also “regrets the effects which the EU regulation relating to the ban on seal products has produced for sections of the population, and in particular for Indigenous culture and livelihood”.
  • supports the meetings held by the Commission with the six associations of circumpolar Indigenous peoples that are recognised as permanent participants in the Arctic Council;
  • underlines the importance of supporting the development of cooperation networks between higher education institutions within and beyond the region, providing opportunities for research funding in order to bring about sustainable economic development in the regions of the Arctic.’

Several other recommendations regarding the Arctic environment can be summarised with the following one:

  • The European Parliament stresses that the increasing use of the Arctic region’s natural resources must be conducted in a way which respects and benefits the local population, both Indigenous and non-Indigenous, and takes full environmental responsibility for the fragile Arctic environment.

Another way in which the EP interacts with the Arctic is as a member of the Conference of Arctic Parliamentarians, which brings together parliamentarians from around the Arctic, and is an observer at the Arctic Council.
The opinions expressed are those of the author.

In the field with a Russian Polar Bear Patrol

From the field, Polar bears,

Polar bear patrol member in Russia. © M.Deminov / WWF Russia

Polar bear patrol member in Russia. © M.Deminov / WWF Russia


While the world celebrated New Year’s Eve, a polar bear patrol was busy keeping polar bears and people safe in the village of Ryrkaypiy, in northeastern Russia.
Ryrkaypiy is the site of a large walrus haulout, or group resting on land. Each year, some walrus carcasses are left behind, and these attract polar bears to town. When possible, community members transport the carcasses away from town, to reduce conflicts between polar bears and people. This year, a couple carcasses near a boiler building on the edge of town brought bears too close for comfort.
Patrol members use snowmobiles, flares, and even long sticks to frighten bears away.

Patrol members Valera Kalyarahtyn and Maxim Deminov shared their notes:
December 28 – a strong blizzard
6:30 – A call from the boiler building, next to which a few walrus carcasses are attracting bears. Valera drove off one bear with the snowmobile. I came across a couple of young bears. Scared away by the snowmobile, they fled towards Cape Kozhevnikova.
12:00 – Two bears were interested in the walrus remains, and we drove them away. Quiet evening.
December 29 – blizzards
12:00: We drove two bears towards the pier on Cape Kozhevnikova. Quiet night and day.
December 30 – Another blizzard.
Quiet morning.
12:30: Another three bears found the walruses near the boiler building. We drove them away on the snowmobiles without flares.
Calm evening.
December 31
6:30: Call from the boiler building. Valera drove a bear away with flares.
8:30: Valera drove three bears away from the boiler.
12:30: All calm.
22:00: The bears waited until dark to come to the boiler. After that, they headed for the village Christmas tree. We drove them away.
January 1
4:00: Two young bears came to the outskirts of the village. Valera scared them away.
6:00: One older bear expelled from the village.
Quiet morning. We patrolled Kozhevnikova and Veber, but didn’t meet any bears.
January 2
7:00 – Three bears on the shore near the boiler room were scared away by the snowmobile, no flares required. Quiet afternoon.
19:00 – An older bear visited building 1 (last house on the shore), and was expelled.
WWF helped found Ryrkaypiy’s patrol in 2006. Today, the model has been successfully replicated in Greenland, Canada, and the United States.
Learn more about WWF’s work to reduce polar bear / human conflict.

5 Arctic success stories in 2015

General, , , ,

There’s no doubt that recent years have been challenging for Arctic wildlife and people. We’re coming to the end of the warmest year on record, with no sign of a cool-down in 2016. Furthermore, the years 2011 to 2015 have been the warmest five-year period on record, according to the World Meteorological Organization.
It’s a trend that hits the Arctic particularly hard. The region is warming about twice as fast as the rest of the world, and the resulting loss of sea ice and permafrost means loss of habitat and livelihoods across the Arctic.


 
But there is good news. Communities and governments in the Arctic and beyond are finding innovative ways to cope with rapid change. And just last week, the world’s leaders finalized a global agreement that lays a foundation for long-term efforts to fight climate change.
Here are five success stories from 2015 that bode well for the Arctic’s future:

5. Arctic offshore drilling kept clear of Norway’s ice

Bearded seal on ice, Spitsbergen, Norway © Wim van Passel / WWF-Canon

Bearded seal on ice, Spitsbergen, Norway
© Wim van Passel / WWF-Canon


In June, Norway’s Parliament rejected a dangerous offshore drilling proposal from its own Ministry of Climate and Environment. The proposal, strongly opposed by WWF and scientific institutions, would have moved the northern limit for offshore drilling in the Barents Sea to the edge of the sea ice – far beyond the recommended limit set by scientific advisers to the Ministry.
 

4. Russia banned driftnet fishing

Frozen salmon © WWF / Kevin Schafer

© WWF / Kevin Schafer


The Russian government announced a ban in July on a destructive fishing practice widely used to catch sockeye salmon in Russia’s Far East. The ban will benefit the communities and Indigenous peoples in the region, where driftnetting has damaged and diverted salmon stocks. The traditional coastal salmon fishery is worth up to $1.6 billion US per year in Kamchatka.
 
 

3. Arctic Nations made a plan for polar bears

Our favourite moment: When we had an extremely inquisitive polar bear swimming around the boat while anchored at Bylot Island. That was a very special moment that had all aboard spellbound.

© Students on Ice / WWF


The five polar bear range states – Canada, the United States, Denmark (Greenland), Russia and Norway – committed in 2013 to making the first ever conservation action plan for polar bears. This September, they followed through. The 10-year plan commits countries to tackling issues like direct threats from shipping and oil and gas, and conflict.
 
 

2. Greenland’s first polar bear patrol launched

foto_charlotte_moshoj_wwf__6_

© Charlotte M. Moshøj / WWF


Sea ice loss is driving polar bears ashore in larger numbers. In the Greenlandic community of Ittoqqortoormiit, encountering a polar bear on the way to school or work is a real, and frightening, possibility. A community polar bear patrol launched this August to scare bears away from town, keeping both bears and people safe.
 
 

1. Shell Abandoned Drilling in America’s Arctic Ocean

Beluga pod in the Chukchi Sea © Laura Morse (NOAA)


After years of searching for oil in the cold and turbulent waters of Alaska’s Chukchi Sea, Shell abandoned its plans to drill for the “foreseeable future.” The announcement followed weeks of unsuccessful summer exploration for oil and gas.
Along with partners and thousands of supporters from around the world, WWF has called to conserve this special place in the Arctic from offshore oil and gas development for today and years to come.

Want to support more great Arctic successes in 2016?
Find your local office here and make a donation.

Fire and Ice

General,

Firefighter at edge of forest and shaded fuelbreak, Alaska. © Alaska Region USFWS

Firefighter at edge of forest and shaded fuelbreak, Alaska. © Alaska Region USFWS


Climate change is one of the most substantial and widespread environmental phenomena of our immediate future, with the effects of global climate change projected to be most severe at high latitudes. Permafrost landscapes make up a large portion of the Northern hemisphere. JEAN HOLLOWAY says understanding the impacts of change for the people, ecosystems and infrastructure in these areas is important.
JEAN HOLLOWAY is a PhD candidate in the Dept. of Geography at Ottawa University focusing on the impacts of forest fires on permafrost in the southern Northwest Territories, Canada. This article appeared in The Circle 04.15.
THERE HAS BEEN substantial winter and spring warming in west-central and northwestern Canada and virtually all of Siberia over the past three decades.
How permafrost is affected by these temperature changes depends on complex interactions among topography, surface water, soil, vegetation, and snow, which vary greatly between sites, even over short distances. Vegetation, in particular, can insulate permafrost from the atmosphere, making it resilient to increases in air temperature, at least in the short term. This ecosystem-protected permafrost covers millions of square kilometres worldwide and is particularly sensitive to climate and environmental change as it is just below 0°C, thin and usually cannot be re-established after disturbance. The most widespread source of disturbance of this permafrost is forest fire.
Forest fires are a natural and essential part of the boreal forest ecosystem, and typically locations burn every 50-300 years. Global warming and greater human activities have increased the frequency and magnitude of forest fires, which generally occur in warm and dry summers. The number of recorded forest fires in Canada has increased substantially in the last 30 years. In Siberia 1.5% of the total forested area burns annually. The response of permafrost to forest fires depends on the degree to which the permafrost is protected by the ecosystem.
The heat from the fire itself does not directly affect permafrost. The damage occurs when intense fires destroy the organic layer that is insulating the ground. This exposes the underlying mineral soil, which is more conductive than the surface organic mat, and allows more heat to get into the ground. Similarly, fire removes trees, which catch snow thus creating a deeper layer of snow that shields the ground from necessary cold winter temperatures. The active layer deepens until the upper layers of permafrost begin to thaw. Other factors that aid in this degradation include decreasing albedo due to surface darkening, and loss of shading from the tree canopy. Soils with permafrost in the coldest and wettest landscape positions (e.g. valleys) usually do not thaw as deeply after fires as soils in warmer and drier positions, such as hilltops or south-facing slopes. Fire severity is also significant, especially the degree to which the ground surface layer is burned. Complete destruction of the forest and the surface organic layer by hot, slow-moving fires will have the greatest impact, while fast-moving fires may skip over patches of forest, and low intensity fires can leave much of the organic layer intact. While the general influence on permafrost is therefore clear, how it will respond at a particular site depends on numerous local factors.
Thaw and degradation of burned areas is expected to continue until sufficient re-vegetation occurs to reestablish the insulating organic mat.
Vegetation recovery after forest fires has a major influence on stabilization of permafrost thaw. Growth is rapid in the first few years, and then slows down with time, as there is more competition for moisture and sunlight. The complete recovery of the ecosystem to pre-burn conditions can take up to 50 years. However, this depends on the climate still being suitable for permafrost. If the permafrost is ecosystem-protected and the climate is warming, permafrost degradation may continue until it disappears entirely.
Forest fires also affect permafrost landscapes in ways that are more noticeable. In the first and second years after a fire, landslides can occur on hill-slopes. Progressive uneven surface subsidence of the ground (called thermokarst) may also occur for years because of melting ground ice within the permafrost. This can affect current infrastructure as well as future development, especially as the frequency of fire means that many developments in the boreal forest may expect to be affected by fire at some point during the lifespan of infrastructure.
Another important effect of forest fires is carbon release during the fires and from thaw of permafrost post-fire. Boreal permafrost soils store large amounts of organic carbon, and fire disturbance influences the amount and type of carbon in the soil. Forest fires release approximately 53 million tonnes of carbon from North American boreal forests each year. Vegetation re-growth post-fire actually ends up storing large amounts of carbon, but in a warming climate with a higher frequency and magnitude of forest fires, this is expected to change. Furthermore, thaw of permafrost following forest fires allows carbon that has been trapped in frozen soils to become available for decomposition by soil microbes. Both these phenomena create a positive-feedback loop: climate change results in a greater frequency and magnitude of forest fires, which release greenhouse gases into the atmosphere, which results in more climate change, and so on.
How permafrost responds to forest fire is a complex issue, but it is clear that a warming climate and the expected increase in the frequency and magnitude of fires will have a substantial impact on permafrost thaw and degradation, especially in the discontinuous zone. It is important that we understand these impacts so we can make informed decisions on fire-management and how to deal with post-fire issues such as landslides and positive feedback adding to climate change.

The tipping point

General,

Thermokarst. Source: Page21.eu

Thermokarst. Source: Page21.eu


Permafrost carbon feedback represents a very slow, but irreversible climatic tipping point. Permafrost will thaw slowly over many years, but once it thaws, you cannot refreeze it, writes KEVIN SCHAEFER.

KEVIN SCHAEFER is a research scientist at the National Snow and Ice Data Center (NSIDC), University of Colorado. This article appeared in The Circle 04.15.
PERMAFROST is perennially frozen ground remaining at or below 0°C for at least two consecutive years. Regions with extensive permafrost occupy about 24% of the land area in the Northern Hemisphere. The active layer is the surface layer of soil above the permafrost that thaws each summer and refreezes each winter. The thickness of the permafrost layer depends upon a delicate balance between freezing from surface due to cold winter temperatures and warming from the Earth’s molten interior. Permafrost is thickest along the Arctic coastline where temperatures are coldest, extending down to depths as great as 1500 meters. Air temperatures increase southward from the Arctic Ocean and the thickness of the permafrost layer becomes progressively thinner, eventually disappearing altogether at latitudes between 50 and 60 degrees north.
The effects of warming temperatures due to global climate change have begun to thaw the permafrost. The effects of climate change are especially strong north of the Arctic Circle, where the warming rate is roughly double the global average. The rising temperatures have caused permafrost to disappear entirely in some regions, moving the southern boundary of the permafrost domain northward. The active layer thaws deeper each year as summer temperatures rise. The temperatures within the permafrost layer itself remain below freezing, but are rising at rates as high as 1°C per decade. These current temperature increases are truly alarming considering that permafrost can take hundreds of years to respond to variations in climate such as the little ice age 400 years ago.
Buildings, roads, and other infrastructure will be damaged or destroyed as permafrost continues to thaw. Ice within permafrost binds soil particles together like cement. Permafrost is hard, dense, and erosion resistant, but if the permafrost thaws, the ice turns to water and the permafrost turns to mud, destabilizing and collapsing buildings with remarkable rapidity. Retreating sea ice has increased wave intensity, resulting in rapid coastal erosion. Indeed, several villages have already been moved because the coast has simply eroded away. Climate change is affecting permafrost, but thawing permafrost will also affect the global climate. Organic matter frozen in permafrost contains enough carbon to easily double the carbon dioxide concentration in the atmosphere. Since the end of the last ice age about 15,000 years ago, this frozen carbon was buried by sedimentation and other processes. The soil depth increased as sediment built up, but the surface thaw depth stayed constant such that organic matter at the bottom of the active layer became frozen into the permafrost. The organic matter will remain stable as long as the permafrost remains frozen, but, like broccoli removed from a freezer, once the organic matter thaws it will decay and release carbon dioxide and methane into the atmosphere. Once released into the atmosphere, this carbon dioxide and methane will amplify warming due to the burning of fossil fuels in a process called the permafrost carbon feedback.
For the ‘business as usual’ scenario where we continue to burn fossil fuels at current rates or higher, thawing permafrost will release ~120 gigatons of carbon by 2100 (a gigaton is a unit of explosive force equal to one billion tons of trinitrotoluene or TNT), equivalent to ~5.7% of anthropogenic emissions. This will increase global temperatures by 0.29 degrees centigrade above the 7-8 degrees expected due to the burning of fossil fuels. Half of the total emissions will occur after 2100 with a total of ~240 gigatons by 2300 resulting in a global temperature increase of ~0.6 degrees centigrade.
The permafrost carbon feedback will complicate the negotiation of the climate change treaty. The international community is currently negotiating a treaty to stop global climate change based on a target of 2 degrees centigrade global warming above preindustrial levels. If we reduce fossil fuel emissions to hit the 2 degree centigrade warming target, the rate of permafrost thaw and associated emissions will go down to ~60 gigatons by 2100 with an additional global warming of ~0.1 degrees. Again, half of the emissions will occur after 2100 with a total of ~120 gigatons by 2300 resulting in a global temperature increase of ~0.2 degrees centigrade. While this is small compared to fossil fuel emissions, if the international climate change treaty does not account for emissions from thawing permafrost, we will overshoot our 2 degree warming target.
The permafrost carbon feedback represents a very slow, but irreversible climatic tipping point. Permafrost will thaw slowly over many years, but once it thaws, you cannot refreeze it. The decay of the thawed organic matter occurs slowly over hundreds of years because the Arctic soils will still be fairly cold and wet. However, once the organic matter decays away, there is no way on human time scales to put it back in the permafrost. In essence, once the permafrost carbon feedback starts, it will persist for centuries.

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Shifting sands – living on permafrost

General,

Gold Rush Buildings, Dawson City, Yukon Territory, Canada. © Terry Feuerborn / CC BY NC 2 via flickr

Gold Rush Buildings, Dawson City, Yukon Territory, Canada. © Terry Feuerborn / CC BY NC 2 via flickr


BRONWYN BENKERT is a research project coordinator with the Northern Climate ExChange, Yukon Research Centre, Yukon College, Whitehorse. This article appeared in The Circle 04.15.
In the North, we live on permafrost. Much of our infrastructure is built on ground that is at or below 0°C for two years or more. We travel across permafrost, and it supports our homes and workplaces. Northerners have long had to contend with permafrost in construction and economic development – in the Klondike gold fields, prospectors at the turn of the 20th century actively thawed frozen ground to reach pay dirt, while workers constructing the Alaska Highway during the Second World War battled thawing ground that never stabilized, forcing on-the-fly adaptation of construction processes.
Northerners continue to adapt to our permafrost environment, which forces us to use ingenuity and innovation as we invest in and maintain infrastructure on permafrost. This task has become increasingly challenging, as a result of compounding factors that include heightened development intensity and a changing climate.
The goal of preserving costly northern infrastructure prompts us to develop a thorough understanding of permafrost characteristics and its dynamic responses to anthropogenic and environmental stressors. In Yukon, research focuses on identifying solutions to permafrost thaw impacts on infrastructure. As the only dedicated permafrost research group in northern Canada, the Northern Climate ExChange (NCE), part of the Yukon Research Centre at Yukon College, is working with community, government and industry partners to assess permafrost vulnerability to thaw, and to identify suitable measures to keep it stable.
Yukoners have regularly witnessed impacts of permafrost thaw on infrastructure. In January 2015, a 15-year-old Yukon school was closed due to concerns about its structural integrity. Shifts in the foundation were attributed, at least in part, to permafrost thaw under the building. Substantial investment was required to repair the building before it could be re-opened in September. Prior to the closure of the school, NCE partnered with Yukon government to assess permafrost conditions and recommend practices that could be used to slow or prevent thaw. These ranged from modified snow clearing practices to engineering solutions. Permafrost cores, ground temperature records and geophysics profiles were collected and analyzed by NCE researchers. Together, these approaches form the basis of our understanding of conditions that contributed to infrastructure vulnerability and damage, and may contribute to the preservation and longevity of our buildings.
Increasingly, permafrost-related information is being integrated as part of the planning process for local development. In Yukon, many communities are proactively adopting adaptive planning approaches, based in part on landscape hazard maps the NCE and its partners have developed. These maps integrate current and future hazards associated with permafrost, surficial geology and hydrology into easy-to-interpret, community-scale maps. The hazard risk maps have assisted Yukon communities and other agencies in choosing suitable locations for new infrastructure by helping them avoid key thaw-sensitive areas, and by allowing them to assess the suitability of development projects for local conditions.
In some cases, choosing stable or non-permafrost locations for infrastructure is impractical. Twenty-five percent of Yukon’s 4800 km highway network is built on permafrost. The maintenance of these sections can cost in excess of 5 times that of non-permafrost sections. Where permafrost is already degrading, the management of nearby water and on-going remediation are continually required to reduce infrastructure deterioration. Further, sections of highway overlying permafrost that are currently stable may be affected by future permafrost degradation – it is likely that permafrost impacts on linear infrastructure will become more significant with time.
Fortunately, modified construction practices and thaw mitigation techniques can be used to preserve permafrost and reduce degradation impacts on linear infrastructure like highways.
However, because variability is inherent in permafrost characteristics and distribution, a reasonable solution for one place may be completely ineffective or even damaging at a nearby location. Recently, NCE completed an assessment of permafrost vulnerability to thaw along the northern 200 km of the Alaska Highway, where ice-rich permafrost is located under much of the highway alignment. This characterization has informed the design of solutions that are tailored to local permafrost conditions. Results will guide Yukon government in making strategic investments in the most promising, effective thaw mitigation techniques adapted to local conditions, reducing on-going maintenance costs and preserving highway integrity.
Promoting resilience to permafrost change in the North is a multi-faceted process. It requires basic information regarding the nature, thermal state, and extent of permafrost, as well as ongoing monitoring of permafrost change. Thaw mitigation techniques can also offer protective benefits to infrastructure. Importantly, the development of northern capacity to respond to northern problems like permafrost impacts on infrastructure is helping to ensure improved infrastructure resiliency for our communities.

Melting permafrost: Climate effects

General,

Melting permafrost: Water pours off a melting permafrost bluff on the Chukchi Coast in Alaska.

Melting permafrost: Water pours off a melting permafrost bluff on the Chukchi Coast in Alaska. Photo: Groundtruthtrekking.org / CC A NC


Soils from the northern circumpolar permafrost zone contain almost twice as much carbon as is currently in the atmosphere. Temperatures in this region are already rising twice as fast as the global average and are expected to keep warming as a result of emissions of carbon from coal, oil, gas and deforestation around the globe. Ted Schuur says a warmer climate causes permafrost ground to thaw, and exposes organic carbon to decomposition by soil microbes.
TED SCHUUR is a Professor of Ecosystem Ecology at Northern Arizona University, USA. This article appeared in The Circle 04.15.

THIS PERMAFROST CARBON is the decomposed remains of plants and animals that have accumulated in perennially frozen ground over hundreds to thousands of years. Thawing permafrost is like having the power cut to your freezer. Just like frozen food that will spoil when thawed, organic carbon in soil is metabolized by bacteria and fungi and transformed into carbon dioxide and methane as part of the natural metabolic cycle of these microorganisms. Carbon dioxide and methane both contain carbon but are produced in different environments by microorganisms depending on how much oxygen is available. Carbon dioxide and methane are also greenhouse gases, trapping heat when released into the atmosphere. Release of permafrost carbon into the atmosphere by this process has the potential to accelerate climate change, making it go faster than we expect based on projections from human emissions alone.
New research has helped solidify the tremendous quantities of permafrost carbon stored in the north. The known pool of permafrost carbon is 1330-1580 billion tons, accounting both for carbon in the surface three meters of soil, and for carbon that is stored much deeper. These deep deposits occur in areas of Siberia and Alaska that remained unglaciated during the last Ice Age, as well as in Arctic river deltas. Even beyond the deep carbon that has been documented, there are permafrost carbon pools that at this point still remain largely a mystery. In particular, there are deep permafrost sediments outside of Siberia and Alaska as well as permafrost that is now beneath the ocean. Ocean permafrost is located on the shallow Arctic sea shelves that were exposed during the last glacial period when the ocean was 120 meters lower than today, since ground must be exposed to frigid air temperatures in order for permafrost to form. These additional deposits are poorly quantified but could add several hundred billions tons more carbon to the known permafrost carbon pool described here.

Thawing permafrost is like having the power cut to your freezer.

The critical question is how much of this permafrost carbon is susceptible to climate change on a timescale that matters to our decision-making. The strength of the permafrost carbon feedback to climate depends on how much carbon is released, how fast it happens, and the form of carbon (carbon dioxide, methane) that makes it to the atmosphere. Research has measured the tremendous quantities of carbon in permafrost soils, but some of this carbon is stored deep in permafrost and will take time before a warmer climate can affect temperatures deep in the ground. Even when thawed, some fraction of organic carbon is susceptible to rapid breakdown and release as greenhouse gases, while another fraction will remain in soil even when the temperatures rise due to other factors that preserve carbon in soils.
Still, initial estimates of potential greenhouse gas release point towards the potential for significant emissions of Carbon from permafrost to the atmosphere in a warmer world. The most recent scientific efforts put the vulnerable fraction about 5-15% of the vast permafrost carbon pool in scenarios where human-caused climate change progresses on its current trajectory. While that vulnerable fraction is on the smaller rather than the larger side of the total pool, it still would result in the addition of billions of tons of additional carbon into the atmosphere. Ten per cent of the known terrestrial permafrost carbon pool is equivalent to 130– 160 billion tons carbon. That amount, if released primarily in the form of CO2 at a constant rate over a century, would make it similar in magnitude to other historically important biospheric sources, such as deforestation, but far less than current and future fossilfuel emissions. Considering CH4 as a fraction of permafrost carbon release would increase the warming impact of these emissions.
Permafrost carbon emissions are likely to occur over decades and centuries as the Arctic warms, making climate change happen even faster than we project on the basis of emissions from human activities alone. Because of momentum in the system and the continued warming and thawing of permafrost, permafrost carbon emissions are likely not only during this century but also beyond. Although never likely to overshadow emissions from fossil fuel, each additional ton of carbon released from the permafrost region to the atmosphere will probably incur additional costs to society. Understanding of the magnitude and timing of permafrost carbon emissions based on new observations and the synthesis of existing data needs to be integrated into policy decisions about the management of carbon in a warming world.