This article originally appeared in The Circle, WWF’s quarterly Arctic journal, issue 01.16. See all articles here. Previous issues of The Circle can be downloaded here.

In 2014, the European Parliament called for the formulation of a “united EU policy on the Arctic” and a “coherent strategy and concretized action plan on the EU’s engagement in the Arctic.” The Council of the European Union also requested the European Commission to further develop “an integrated and coherent Arctic Policy”. However, as ADAM STĘPIEŃ observes, it appears nobody knows how to accomplish such a coherent approach. STĘPIEŃ is a researcher in the Arctic Centre at University of Lapland, Finland. He works on Arctic governance, Indigenous politics and the EU-Arctic nexus. He was a co-editor of the 2014 “Strategic Assessment of Development of the Arctic”.
SINCE THE END of 2014, the European External Action Service (EEAS) and the European Commission have been working on a new policy document. The new communication is likely to build on priorities proposed in earlier statements, but a more explicit distinction between the two geographic policy spaces – European Arctic and pan-Arctic issues – may also be expected. But that may, however, not go far enough to promote greater coherence in EU Arctic activities and address diverse challenges related to the EU-Arctic nexus. Therefore, the EU policymakers should consider a two-tier structure for future Arctic policy.
These two tiers would be: a general policy for the Circumpolar Arctic and a focused strategy for the European Arctic. The latter would address chosen challenges associated with Arctic environmental and socio-economic changes, as they are manifested in Europe’s northernmost regions.
The EU has been formulating its Arctic policy since 2008. Its interest was originally related to the predicted climate-driven, profound environmental changes such as melting sea-ice, as well as overblown expectations for a boom in resource extraction and shipping. As a result, the EU focused on the Arctic Ocean environment, resources and international cooperation. This focus is still dominant.
However, over time the policy encompassed topics relevant for the European Arctic including regional development, terrestrial transport, mining and the Indigenous Sámi issues. Actors from Europe’s northernmost regions had pointed out that the EU policy ignored part of the Arctic, which is inhabited by EU citizens and directly affected by EU legislation, policies and programmes. The EU Arctic policy has so far mixed up the two distinct spaces: Circumpolar and European Arctic. That partly contributed to analysts’ and Arctic stakeholders’ disappointment with consecutive EU policy documents, which lacked concreteness and focus.
EU policy-making for the Circumpolar Arctic and European Arctic entails dealing with two different sets of issues and engaging different stakeholders. Circumpolar Arctic questions are primarily of maritime nature where the EU is a secondary actor, while European Arctic challenges are chiefly terrestrial and the EU is there a key player. When the calls for a “coherent strategy” are voiced, usually they refer to the European Arctic space.
A solution would be to bring under one framework two distinct approaches and organizing EU Arctic engagement into a two-tier “policy + strategy”. A Circumpolar Arctic policy-tier would retain the current set of general, vague objectives. It would include maritime issues, climate change mitigation, climate and ocean research, earth observation, involvement in the Arctic Council, and the EU’s role in shaping Arctic-relevant international norms, such as for Arctic shipping or long-range pollution.
A focused strategy for the European Arctic constitutes the second tier. It would address challenges arising from Arctic change as they are manifested in Europe’s northernmost regions. A short list of specific goals or targets would be identified together with Nordic states, northernmost regions and local stakeholders. Concrete action plans have to be agreed on. All relevant actors need to commit to the targets and to the implementation of actions.
Several possible goals for the strategy- tier could be envisaged. Actors have to jointly address climate adaptation in Europe’s fastest warming region. Among targets could be the North- South and intra-regional transport networks, digital connectivity, as well as tackling developmental or demographic problems specific to this sparsely populated area. The challenges faced by the Sámi also have to be highlighted, including energizing traditional livelihoods in light of expanding resource extraction.
The strategy-tier is likely to emphasize economic development, as that is the approach promoted by many regional stakeholders. Embedding the European Arctic strategy into the general Arctic policy could help to safeguard the balance with environmental priorities. Otherwise, the environment might get lost between the lines.
There are a number of issues that are relevant from the point of view of both pan-Arctic cooperation and the European Arctic development. These include cooperation within the Barents region (Barents Euro-Arctic Council, where the Commission is a full member), cross-border transport networks extending to Russia and Norway, and pan-Arctic business and NGO cooperation. A two-tier policy would deal with these issues better than two disconnected policies – for the Arctic and for Northern Fennoscandia. Iceland and Norway are the European Economic Area members and Norwegian regions are particularly closely linked to the EU territories. If willing, these states should fully participate in the drafting and implementation of the strategy-tier.
The strategy-tier has to have added value in relation to existing structures such as the Northern Dimension, regional cooperation, and cross-border programmes, for example Northern Periphery and Arctic Programme. No new funding mechanisms or bureaucracy should be proposed, as they are unlikely to be established. Instead, the strategy could streamline existing financing, prevent duplications and in the long-term affect priorities of funding instruments. The formulation and implementation of the strategy could also influence general EU sectoral policies, insofar as they have distinct implications for the European Arctic.
The two-tier policy requires organizational adjustments. Currently, the European External Action Service and the DG Maritime Affairs and Fisheries coordinate Arctic policy-making. That would continue to be the case for the first tier of the EU Arctic policy, where the focus is on maritime and external affairs. The strategy-tier should be led by the Commission’s units responsible for regional development, transport or environment. In addition, establishing a network of national contact points or a stakeholder forum could be considered.
A two-tier structure would allow the “EU Arctic Policy” to better accommodate diverse interests and to make a tangible difference in various EU Arctic-related activities, without causing anxiety among Arctic states and other actors. Nevertheless, this is arguably an ambitious approach. It calls for a more comprehensive way of thinking about the EU-Arctic nexus and for a different coordination of Arctic portfolios within EU services.

This article originally appeared in The Circle, WWF’s quarterly Arctic journal, issue 01.16. See all articles here. Previous issues of The Circle can be downloaded here.
Finland is a member of both the EU and the Arctic Council. It is an active participant in the European integration project – the process of industrial, political, legal, economic, social and cultural integration of states through the European Union. TIMO KOIVUROVA says although Finland is a “small actor” in the EU, he writes that this country has – with some success – played its “northern card” to pursue its own interests and policy goals while encouraging the EU to pay more attention to Arctic issues. Koivurova is a director of the Arctic Centre of the University of Lapland, Finland. His expertise includes Arctic legal & governance questions, environmental law & Indigenous rights.

FINLAND JOINED the EU in 1995 after a referendum which saw nearly 57% of Finns supporting membership for mainly commercial and political reasons. Most of Finland’s trading partners were located in EU member states. Finland was recovering from the collapse of the Soviet Union and the Nordic banking crisis in the early 1990s, and EU membership can be seen as a natural evolution of Finland’s foreign policy. Since the 1950s, foreign policy decisions have been cautiously – due to the delicate relationship with the Soviet Union – but consistently establishing ties with Western intergovernmental institutions, culminating with EU membership. It was also significant that Finland, Norway and Sweden decided to pursue EU membership at the same time. Finland had strong international co-operation with the Nordic states prior to EU membership with especially good economic and social ties with Sweden.
Finland has been generally supportive towards deepening the role of the EU as an economic and political union. Compared with other Nordic states, Finland has clearly been the most EU-minded. It is the only Nordic country that joined the monetary union, adopting the Euro as its currency while Sweden and Denmark remained outside of the Eurozone.
Norway and Iceland have ties with the EU through the European Economic Area Agreement, but Norway has twice rejected EU membership while Iceland has ended its membership negotiations, which commenced after the island nation was struck by the banking crisis.
In the last two decades, major political parties in Finland have favoured EU membership, with the exception of the populist Finns party, which is currently in government. The Finnish people have also been fairly supportive of EU membership although those critical are often unhappy with the extensive range of EU legislation regulating many aspects of Finnish economic and social life.
What, then, is the influence of a small Nordic country on this pan-European regulatory framework, now crucial for Finland? A member state’s influence in the EU is, to a great extent, based on how the country actually pursues its policy goals and interests in the Union. Finland is considered to be fairly active. Finns emphasize efficiency and openness of decision-making and they have a reputation of implementing EU legislation in an effective manner.
Finland also has a strong track record as an active participant in Arctic cooperation. Finland proposed and led the initiative to launch the 1991 Arctic Environmental Protection Strategy (AEPS) between the eight Arctic states. This strategy was later adopted by the current Arctic Council. However, while Finland has significantly contributed to the work of the Council, it is not a major player in Arctic politics compared with Arctic Ocean coastal states and especially major Arctic powers such as Russia, Canada and the United States.
Finland attempted to merge these South-Western and Northern policy directions through the successful proposal of the Northern Dimension policy for the EU. Since 2006, the Northern Dimension has been resuscitated as a joint policy between the EU, Iceland, Norway and Russia.
Finland has also been very supportive of making the EU an Observer at the Arctic Council. The EU’s increased presence and funding could support Finnish policies and socio-economic needs, including research, maritime governance, the development of Europe’s northernmost regions and Finnish stances on Arctic climate change and environmental conservation.
There are no real tensions or contradictions arising from Finland being a member of both the EU and the Arctic Council. The Arctic Council’s influences largely comprise scientific assessments and guidelines and the co-operation does not entail any legally binding obligations. However the Arctic Council has recently catalysed two legally binding agreements between the eight Arctic states on search and rescue and oil spill response. More are likely for the future.
Therefore, the EU institutions need to make sure that any legal obligations are in accordance with what Finland and other EU members have committed themselves to in EU law. So far, no problems are apparent given that both new legally binding agreements are based on existing global treaties that are already part of EU law.
However, if the Arctic Council were to transform from an intergovernmental forum into a treaty-based intergovernmental organization with legal decisionmaking power – a scenario Finland proposed in its 2013 Arctic strategy for the Arctic states to seriously consider – there would need to be clearer understanding of possible member states’ duties to co-ordinate their Arctic policies within the Arctic Council and to pay attention to the duties set out by the EU’s legal system.

This article originally appeared in The Circle, WWF’s quarterly Arctic journal, issue 01.16. See all articles here. See all issues of The Circle here.
Over the past decade the European Union has become one of the largest funders of Arctic research through numerous collaborative projects, coordination activities and support to infrastructures. NICOLE BIEBOW says this has established a rewarding interplay between the scientific community and European policy makers. Biebow is a marine geologist and executive manager of the EU Coordination and Support Action EU-PolarNet.
AS THE ARCTIC CHANGES the European Union and its executive body, the European Commission (EC), are placing increasing importance on science and innovation in the high latitudes – for a variety of reasons.
Changing weather patterns and climate, for example, are altering the sensitive ecosystem in the Arctic. Climate change triggers feedback processes which will have an impact on the global climate system. Europe will consequently be directly influenced by those changes – colder winters being only one of the anticipated effects. Understanding these feedback loops and their implications for European society, improving predictive climate models and reducing existing uncertainties have hence become vital.
But changes in the Arctic also present economic opportunities for local communities, Arctic nations and Europe at large. Thus the European Union has an interest in a continuous, but sustainable development of the Arctic. Scienceinformed decision making is key to safeguarding the fragile ecosystems of the North, to limit risks and to enable adaptation of local communities. These ecologic, societal and economic challenges and opportunities arising from Arctic change have resulted in five key considerations of the EC regarding Arctic research:
Firstly, the EC promotes open science, meaning open access to research infrastructure, to data and to scientific results. A meaningful contribution to a growing and shared body of knowledge is dependent upon scientists having access to all available sources of data in order to facilitate an integrated review system for Arctic science.
The EC also strives to increase the predictive capabilities of climatic changes, feedback processes and weather events through improving the quality, the frequency and the geographic coverage of sustained observations. This implies an integration of space, remote, ground-based and underwater tools.
Technical innovation is highlighted here as a mean of reducing high costs, which previously have been seen as a limiting factor in sustainable development. The EC seeks to establish an open international cooperation. Funding programmes of the EC are already open to applicants worldwide – a standard that the EC hopes to see being replicated.
The EC says it is important to involve Indigenous people, local communities, and the relevant stakeholders in a sustainable development agenda. “We wish to make the Arctic a test bed for sustainable innovation, developing protocols and standards, which can guarantee protection and sustainable exploitation”, says Andrea Tilche, Head of the Climate Action and Earth Observation Unit, Directorate General for Research and Innovation of the European Commission.
And finally, the EC states that none of these objectives can be reached without engaging local communities and relevant stakeholders. For this reason one of the first steps in its Horizon 2020 framework programme for research and innovation was to establish a new coordination action, EU-PolarNet. This consortium – the world’s largest in expertise and infrastructure for polar research – has been called upon to assist the EC in giving advice in polar related questions, coordinating polar research and infrastructures in Europe and in identifying the highest priority research topics.
The EC has now proposed an investment of about 40 Million Euros in Arctic research and innovation for 2016/2017, which focuses on the following key strategic areas: The development of an integrated observation system for the Arctic; the assessment of the impact of Arctic changes on the weather and climate of the Northern latitudes; and the impact of climate change on the Arctic, in particular on permafrost and its possible feedback and the socio-economic consequences. To tackle these questions, the EC seeks multidisciplinary and international projects with strong stakeholder involvement.
Such an investment is of high importance to European polar research owing to the remarkable range of skills, knowledge and infrastructure that can be mobilised and coordinated in large EU projects. This will allow bigger and more complex science problems to be addressed, which are beyond the capacity of one single nation.

This article originally appeared in The Circle, WWF’s quarterly Arctic journal, issue 01.16. See all articles here. Previous issues of The Circle can be downloaded here.
One of the few things most people know about the European Union (EU) in the Arctic is that it has repeatedly been denied formal Observer status at the Arctic Council – the region’s dedicated organ for cooperation. That may give the impression that one of Europe’s strongest organizations is still knocking on the door of the Arctic from the outside. As ALYSON BAILES writes, that is not the case. Bailes is an Adjunct Professor at the University of Iceland specializing in Nordic & Arctic security issues.

THE EU IS ALREADY interlinked with the Arctic at many levels: membership, partnership, trade, rule-making, and practical cooperation. Whether this complex relationship is optimally managed is a different question. Is the EU clear on what it wants from the Arctic process, and effective in pursuing it? Is it working as best it might for a peaceful, sustainable Arctic future?

Conflict or even violent competition around the Pole would be bound to spill over southwards, bringing strategic as well as economic risks.

To start with the facts: three of the Arctic Council’s eight member states – Denmark, Finland and Sweden – are full EU members. Two more, Iceland and Norway, as members of the European Economic Area, belong to the Single Market and the Schengen Convention – agreements that make them part of the EU’s single territory without internal borders or regulatory obstacles for the free movement of goods and services, and with a common visa policy.
The remaining three, Canada, Russia and the US, are key partners of the EU in trade, investment and other policy areas. All EU rules and agreements accepted by these countries apply equally to their northernmost territories and, indeed, to their Extended Economic Zones in the Arctic seas. This EU ‘regulatory footprint’ is particularly strong in the case of fisheries management – on which Greenland and the Faroe Islands, while not included in Denmark’s EU membership, also have agreements with Brussels – and on climate change policy.
Given the way ‘money talks’ however, European economic and financial involvement is at least equally important. The EU is the leading foreign customer for oil and gas already produced in the Arctic by Russia and Norway, and for Arctic catches of fish. It registers and insures a significant proportion of Arctic shipping and generates an increasing flow of tourism into the Arctic lands and seas. Brussels also supplies funds for cooperative projects from Russia to Greenland through its Northern Dimension regional programme and other cross-border frameworks in Northernmost Europe. It spends a large and growing amount on Arctic-related monitoring and research.
When the EU first began framing an Arctic policy in 2008-09, it made clear that its main interest lay in a peaceful Arctic future grounded in law-based cooperation. Conflict or even violent competition around the Pole would be bound to spill over southwards, bringing strategic as well as economic risks. Accordingly, the EU supports the Arctic Council’s current policy of working as normally as possible with Russia on Arctic issues despite the Ukraine-related crisis.
Brussels has consistently backed other goals of the Arctic Council such as environmental protection and sustainable economic development, shipping safety, scientific cooperation, and the rights of Indigenous peoples. It can use its powerful regulatory clout and financial incentives to promote these. On other issues, such as its anti-whaling policy and trade ban on seal products, the EU has sometimes clashed with Arctic interest groups. This was initially complicating its bid for Arctic Council observership, though recent moves have been made for compromise. On fisheries, the EU is close to the Arctic Council mainstream in believing that the exploitation of new ice-free waters should be delayed pending a full scientific assessment.
So far so good: but why then is the EU still not seen as a suitable Arctic Council observer? Politically, the latest complication is that the EU economic sanctions adopted during the Ukraine crisis have angered Russia and are, in fact, starting to block off some funding options for Arctic projects. The EU’s problem here is that it has an overall stance towards Moscow in which the Arctic plays only a limited part, and its legalistic nature gives it less scope than a national government to vary its approach in different cases. At least temporarily, therefore, Brussels finds it hard to come forward as a clean-handed supporter of the Arctic peace it sincerely seeks.
There are also more mundane problems. The EU’s ‘diplomatic service’ (the European External Action Service) claims coordinating rights over Arctic policy, but the more important practical fields like shipping, fisheries and climate policy development are run by the European Commission. Maintaining coherence is a struggle. Moreover, many EU nations have yet to take Arctic issues seriously and two of the front-liners – Denmark and Sweden – have mixed feelings about possible Brussels interference. Germany, the UK and France have only very recently defined their Arctic aims.
All this said, further delay over the Arctic Council Observership is more a symbolic than a practical block to stronger EU involvement. Much could be achieved by tighter coordination, more flexible funding, and a more sensitive grasp of Arctic partners’ own aims and feelings.