This article originally appeared in The Circle, WWF’s quarterly Arctic journal, issue 01.16. See all articles here. Previous issues of The Circle can be downloaded here.

In 2014, the European Parliament called for the formulation of a “united EU policy on the Arctic” and a “coherent strategy and concretized action plan on the EU’s engagement in the Arctic.” The Council of the European Union also requested the European Commission to further develop “an integrated and coherent Arctic Policy”. However, as ADAM STĘPIEŃ observes, it appears nobody knows how to accomplish such a coherent approach. STĘPIEŃ is a researcher in the Arctic Centre at University of Lapland, Finland. He works on Arctic governance, Indigenous politics and the EU-Arctic nexus. He was a co-editor of the 2014 “Strategic Assessment of Development of the Arctic”.
SINCE THE END of 2014, the European External Action Service (EEAS) and the European Commission have been working on a new policy document. The new communication is likely to build on priorities proposed in earlier statements, but a more explicit distinction between the two geographic policy spaces – European Arctic and pan-Arctic issues – may also be expected. But that may, however, not go far enough to promote greater coherence in EU Arctic activities and address diverse challenges related to the EU-Arctic nexus. Therefore, the EU policymakers should consider a two-tier structure for future Arctic policy.
These two tiers would be: a general policy for the Circumpolar Arctic and a focused strategy for the European Arctic. The latter would address chosen challenges associated with Arctic environmental and socio-economic changes, as they are manifested in Europe’s northernmost regions.
The EU has been formulating its Arctic policy since 2008. Its interest was originally related to the predicted climate-driven, profound environmental changes such as melting sea-ice, as well as overblown expectations for a boom in resource extraction and shipping. As a result, the EU focused on the Arctic Ocean environment, resources and international cooperation. This focus is still dominant.
However, over time the policy encompassed topics relevant for the European Arctic including regional development, terrestrial transport, mining and the Indigenous Sámi issues. Actors from Europe’s northernmost regions had pointed out that the EU policy ignored part of the Arctic, which is inhabited by EU citizens and directly affected by EU legislation, policies and programmes. The EU Arctic policy has so far mixed up the two distinct spaces: Circumpolar and European Arctic. That partly contributed to analysts’ and Arctic stakeholders’ disappointment with consecutive EU policy documents, which lacked concreteness and focus.
EU policy-making for the Circumpolar Arctic and European Arctic entails dealing with two different sets of issues and engaging different stakeholders. Circumpolar Arctic questions are primarily of maritime nature where the EU is a secondary actor, while European Arctic challenges are chiefly terrestrial and the EU is there a key player. When the calls for a “coherent strategy” are voiced, usually they refer to the European Arctic space.
A solution would be to bring under one framework two distinct approaches and organizing EU Arctic engagement into a two-tier “policy + strategy”. A Circumpolar Arctic policy-tier would retain the current set of general, vague objectives. It would include maritime issues, climate change mitigation, climate and ocean research, earth observation, involvement in the Arctic Council, and the EU’s role in shaping Arctic-relevant international norms, such as for Arctic shipping or long-range pollution.
A focused strategy for the European Arctic constitutes the second tier. It would address challenges arising from Arctic change as they are manifested in Europe’s northernmost regions. A short list of specific goals or targets would be identified together with Nordic states, northernmost regions and local stakeholders. Concrete action plans have to be agreed on. All relevant actors need to commit to the targets and to the implementation of actions.
Several possible goals for the strategy- tier could be envisaged. Actors have to jointly address climate adaptation in Europe’s fastest warming region. Among targets could be the North- South and intra-regional transport networks, digital connectivity, as well as tackling developmental or demographic problems specific to this sparsely populated area. The challenges faced by the Sámi also have to be highlighted, including energizing traditional livelihoods in light of expanding resource extraction.
The strategy-tier is likely to emphasize economic development, as that is the approach promoted by many regional stakeholders. Embedding the European Arctic strategy into the general Arctic policy could help to safeguard the balance with environmental priorities. Otherwise, the environment might get lost between the lines.
There are a number of issues that are relevant from the point of view of both pan-Arctic cooperation and the European Arctic development. These include cooperation within the Barents region (Barents Euro-Arctic Council, where the Commission is a full member), cross-border transport networks extending to Russia and Norway, and pan-Arctic business and NGO cooperation. A two-tier policy would deal with these issues better than two disconnected policies – for the Arctic and for Northern Fennoscandia. Iceland and Norway are the European Economic Area members and Norwegian regions are particularly closely linked to the EU territories. If willing, these states should fully participate in the drafting and implementation of the strategy-tier.
The strategy-tier has to have added value in relation to existing structures such as the Northern Dimension, regional cooperation, and cross-border programmes, for example Northern Periphery and Arctic Programme. No new funding mechanisms or bureaucracy should be proposed, as they are unlikely to be established. Instead, the strategy could streamline existing financing, prevent duplications and in the long-term affect priorities of funding instruments. The formulation and implementation of the strategy could also influence general EU sectoral policies, insofar as they have distinct implications for the European Arctic.
The two-tier policy requires organizational adjustments. Currently, the European External Action Service and the DG Maritime Affairs and Fisheries coordinate Arctic policy-making. That would continue to be the case for the first tier of the EU Arctic policy, where the focus is on maritime and external affairs. The strategy-tier should be led by the Commission’s units responsible for regional development, transport or environment. In addition, establishing a network of national contact points or a stakeholder forum could be considered.
A two-tier structure would allow the “EU Arctic Policy” to better accommodate diverse interests and to make a tangible difference in various EU Arctic-related activities, without causing anxiety among Arctic states and other actors. Nevertheless, this is arguably an ambitious approach. It calls for a more comprehensive way of thinking about the EU-Arctic nexus and for a different coordination of Arctic portfolios within EU services.

This article originally appeared in The Circle, WWF’s quarterly Arctic journal, issue 01.16. See all articles here. Previous issues of The Circle can be downloaded here.
Finland is a member of both the EU and the Arctic Council. It is an active participant in the European integration project – the process of industrial, political, legal, economic, social and cultural integration of states through the European Union. TIMO KOIVUROVA says although Finland is a “small actor” in the EU, he writes that this country has – with some success – played its “northern card” to pursue its own interests and policy goals while encouraging the EU to pay more attention to Arctic issues. Koivurova is a director of the Arctic Centre of the University of Lapland, Finland. His expertise includes Arctic legal & governance questions, environmental law & Indigenous rights.

FINLAND JOINED the EU in 1995 after a referendum which saw nearly 57% of Finns supporting membership for mainly commercial and political reasons. Most of Finland’s trading partners were located in EU member states. Finland was recovering from the collapse of the Soviet Union and the Nordic banking crisis in the early 1990s, and EU membership can be seen as a natural evolution of Finland’s foreign policy. Since the 1950s, foreign policy decisions have been cautiously – due to the delicate relationship with the Soviet Union – but consistently establishing ties with Western intergovernmental institutions, culminating with EU membership. It was also significant that Finland, Norway and Sweden decided to pursue EU membership at the same time. Finland had strong international co-operation with the Nordic states prior to EU membership with especially good economic and social ties with Sweden.
Finland has been generally supportive towards deepening the role of the EU as an economic and political union. Compared with other Nordic states, Finland has clearly been the most EU-minded. It is the only Nordic country that joined the monetary union, adopting the Euro as its currency while Sweden and Denmark remained outside of the Eurozone.
Norway and Iceland have ties with the EU through the European Economic Area Agreement, but Norway has twice rejected EU membership while Iceland has ended its membership negotiations, which commenced after the island nation was struck by the banking crisis.
In the last two decades, major political parties in Finland have favoured EU membership, with the exception of the populist Finns party, which is currently in government. The Finnish people have also been fairly supportive of EU membership although those critical are often unhappy with the extensive range of EU legislation regulating many aspects of Finnish economic and social life.
What, then, is the influence of a small Nordic country on this pan-European regulatory framework, now crucial for Finland? A member state’s influence in the EU is, to a great extent, based on how the country actually pursues its policy goals and interests in the Union. Finland is considered to be fairly active. Finns emphasize efficiency and openness of decision-making and they have a reputation of implementing EU legislation in an effective manner.
Finland also has a strong track record as an active participant in Arctic cooperation. Finland proposed and led the initiative to launch the 1991 Arctic Environmental Protection Strategy (AEPS) between the eight Arctic states. This strategy was later adopted by the current Arctic Council. However, while Finland has significantly contributed to the work of the Council, it is not a major player in Arctic politics compared with Arctic Ocean coastal states and especially major Arctic powers such as Russia, Canada and the United States.
Finland attempted to merge these South-Western and Northern policy directions through the successful proposal of the Northern Dimension policy for the EU. Since 2006, the Northern Dimension has been resuscitated as a joint policy between the EU, Iceland, Norway and Russia.
Finland has also been very supportive of making the EU an Observer at the Arctic Council. The EU’s increased presence and funding could support Finnish policies and socio-economic needs, including research, maritime governance, the development of Europe’s northernmost regions and Finnish stances on Arctic climate change and environmental conservation.
There are no real tensions or contradictions arising from Finland being a member of both the EU and the Arctic Council. The Arctic Council’s influences largely comprise scientific assessments and guidelines and the co-operation does not entail any legally binding obligations. However the Arctic Council has recently catalysed two legally binding agreements between the eight Arctic states on search and rescue and oil spill response. More are likely for the future.
Therefore, the EU institutions need to make sure that any legal obligations are in accordance with what Finland and other EU members have committed themselves to in EU law. So far, no problems are apparent given that both new legally binding agreements are based on existing global treaties that are already part of EU law.
However, if the Arctic Council were to transform from an intergovernmental forum into a treaty-based intergovernmental organization with legal decisionmaking power – a scenario Finland proposed in its 2013 Arctic strategy for the Arctic states to seriously consider – there would need to be clearer understanding of possible member states’ duties to co-ordinate their Arctic policies within the Arctic Council and to pay attention to the duties set out by the EU’s legal system.

This article originally appeared in The Circle, WWF’s quarterly Arctic journal, issue 01.16. See all articles here. See all issues of The Circle here.
Over the past decade the European Union has become one of the largest funders of Arctic research through numerous collaborative projects, coordination activities and support to infrastructures. NICOLE BIEBOW says this has established a rewarding interplay between the scientific community and European policy makers. Biebow is a marine geologist and executive manager of the EU Coordination and Support Action EU-PolarNet.
AS THE ARCTIC CHANGES the European Union and its executive body, the European Commission (EC), are placing increasing importance on science and innovation in the high latitudes – for a variety of reasons.
Changing weather patterns and climate, for example, are altering the sensitive ecosystem in the Arctic. Climate change triggers feedback processes which will have an impact on the global climate system. Europe will consequently be directly influenced by those changes – colder winters being only one of the anticipated effects. Understanding these feedback loops and their implications for European society, improving predictive climate models and reducing existing uncertainties have hence become vital.
But changes in the Arctic also present economic opportunities for local communities, Arctic nations and Europe at large. Thus the European Union has an interest in a continuous, but sustainable development of the Arctic. Scienceinformed decision making is key to safeguarding the fragile ecosystems of the North, to limit risks and to enable adaptation of local communities. These ecologic, societal and economic challenges and opportunities arising from Arctic change have resulted in five key considerations of the EC regarding Arctic research:
Firstly, the EC promotes open science, meaning open access to research infrastructure, to data and to scientific results. A meaningful contribution to a growing and shared body of knowledge is dependent upon scientists having access to all available sources of data in order to facilitate an integrated review system for Arctic science.
The EC also strives to increase the predictive capabilities of climatic changes, feedback processes and weather events through improving the quality, the frequency and the geographic coverage of sustained observations. This implies an integration of space, remote, ground-based and underwater tools.
Technical innovation is highlighted here as a mean of reducing high costs, which previously have been seen as a limiting factor in sustainable development. The EC seeks to establish an open international cooperation. Funding programmes of the EC are already open to applicants worldwide – a standard that the EC hopes to see being replicated.
The EC says it is important to involve Indigenous people, local communities, and the relevant stakeholders in a sustainable development agenda. “We wish to make the Arctic a test bed for sustainable innovation, developing protocols and standards, which can guarantee protection and sustainable exploitation”, says Andrea Tilche, Head of the Climate Action and Earth Observation Unit, Directorate General for Research and Innovation of the European Commission.
And finally, the EC states that none of these objectives can be reached without engaging local communities and relevant stakeholders. For this reason one of the first steps in its Horizon 2020 framework programme for research and innovation was to establish a new coordination action, EU-PolarNet. This consortium – the world’s largest in expertise and infrastructure for polar research – has been called upon to assist the EC in giving advice in polar related questions, coordinating polar research and infrastructures in Europe and in identifying the highest priority research topics.
The EC has now proposed an investment of about 40 Million Euros in Arctic research and innovation for 2016/2017, which focuses on the following key strategic areas: The development of an integrated observation system for the Arctic; the assessment of the impact of Arctic changes on the weather and climate of the Northern latitudes; and the impact of climate change on the Arctic, in particular on permafrost and its possible feedback and the socio-economic consequences. To tackle these questions, the EC seeks multidisciplinary and international projects with strong stakeholder involvement.
Such an investment is of high importance to European polar research owing to the remarkable range of skills, knowledge and infrastructure that can be mobilised and coordinated in large EU projects. This will allow bigger and more complex science problems to be addressed, which are beyond the capacity of one single nation.

This article originally appeared in The Circle, WWF’s quarterly Arctic journal, issue 01.16. See all articles here. Previous issues of The Circle can be downloaded here.
One of the few things most people know about the European Union (EU) in the Arctic is that it has repeatedly been denied formal Observer status at the Arctic Council – the region’s dedicated organ for cooperation. That may give the impression that one of Europe’s strongest organizations is still knocking on the door of the Arctic from the outside. As ALYSON BAILES writes, that is not the case. Bailes is an Adjunct Professor at the University of Iceland specializing in Nordic & Arctic security issues.

THE EU IS ALREADY interlinked with the Arctic at many levels: membership, partnership, trade, rule-making, and practical cooperation. Whether this complex relationship is optimally managed is a different question. Is the EU clear on what it wants from the Arctic process, and effective in pursuing it? Is it working as best it might for a peaceful, sustainable Arctic future?

Conflict or even violent competition around the Pole would be bound to spill over southwards, bringing strategic as well as economic risks.

To start with the facts: three of the Arctic Council’s eight member states – Denmark, Finland and Sweden – are full EU members. Two more, Iceland and Norway, as members of the European Economic Area, belong to the Single Market and the Schengen Convention – agreements that make them part of the EU’s single territory without internal borders or regulatory obstacles for the free movement of goods and services, and with a common visa policy.
The remaining three, Canada, Russia and the US, are key partners of the EU in trade, investment and other policy areas. All EU rules and agreements accepted by these countries apply equally to their northernmost territories and, indeed, to their Extended Economic Zones in the Arctic seas. This EU ‘regulatory footprint’ is particularly strong in the case of fisheries management – on which Greenland and the Faroe Islands, while not included in Denmark’s EU membership, also have agreements with Brussels – and on climate change policy.
Given the way ‘money talks’ however, European economic and financial involvement is at least equally important. The EU is the leading foreign customer for oil and gas already produced in the Arctic by Russia and Norway, and for Arctic catches of fish. It registers and insures a significant proportion of Arctic shipping and generates an increasing flow of tourism into the Arctic lands and seas. Brussels also supplies funds for cooperative projects from Russia to Greenland through its Northern Dimension regional programme and other cross-border frameworks in Northernmost Europe. It spends a large and growing amount on Arctic-related monitoring and research.
When the EU first began framing an Arctic policy in 2008-09, it made clear that its main interest lay in a peaceful Arctic future grounded in law-based cooperation. Conflict or even violent competition around the Pole would be bound to spill over southwards, bringing strategic as well as economic risks. Accordingly, the EU supports the Arctic Council’s current policy of working as normally as possible with Russia on Arctic issues despite the Ukraine-related crisis.
Brussels has consistently backed other goals of the Arctic Council such as environmental protection and sustainable economic development, shipping safety, scientific cooperation, and the rights of Indigenous peoples. It can use its powerful regulatory clout and financial incentives to promote these. On other issues, such as its anti-whaling policy and trade ban on seal products, the EU has sometimes clashed with Arctic interest groups. This was initially complicating its bid for Arctic Council observership, though recent moves have been made for compromise. On fisheries, the EU is close to the Arctic Council mainstream in believing that the exploitation of new ice-free waters should be delayed pending a full scientific assessment.
So far so good: but why then is the EU still not seen as a suitable Arctic Council observer? Politically, the latest complication is that the EU economic sanctions adopted during the Ukraine crisis have angered Russia and are, in fact, starting to block off some funding options for Arctic projects. The EU’s problem here is that it has an overall stance towards Moscow in which the Arctic plays only a limited part, and its legalistic nature gives it less scope than a national government to vary its approach in different cases. At least temporarily, therefore, Brussels finds it hard to come forward as a clean-handed supporter of the Arctic peace it sincerely seeks.
There are also more mundane problems. The EU’s ‘diplomatic service’ (the European External Action Service) claims coordinating rights over Arctic policy, but the more important practical fields like shipping, fisheries and climate policy development are run by the European Commission. Maintaining coherence is a struggle. Moreover, many EU nations have yet to take Arctic issues seriously and two of the front-liners – Denmark and Sweden – have mixed feelings about possible Brussels interference. Germany, the UK and France have only very recently defined their Arctic aims.
All this said, further delay over the Arctic Council Observership is more a symbolic than a practical block to stronger EU involvement. Much could be achieved by tighter coordination, more flexible funding, and a more sensitive grasp of Arctic partners’ own aims and feelings.

This article originally appeared in The Circle, WWF’s quarterly Arctic journal, issue 01.16. See all articles here. Previous issues of The Circle can be downloaded here.

Gone are the days of the 19th and early 20th century when Britain’s Royal Navy ruled the seven seas and saw itself as   the world’s peacekeeper through flying the flag or – on occasion – using its gunboat diplomacy. Also gone are the days when British explorers were among the few that first mapped the most remote and inhospitable regions of our planet. While the balances of power have changed, as LORD ROBIN TEVERSON points out, geography has not. Teverson is a Liberal Democrat politician in the British parliament’s House of Lords.
BRITAIN IS STILL the nearest neighbouring non-Arctic state. The northernmost tip of the British Isles, the Shetland Island’s ‘Out Stack’ or Oosta, is a mere 320 nautical miles south of the Arctic Circle. The Arctic remains a part of the UK’s backyard. What happens there – climate change, pollution, security, shipping routes, or territorial claims – has a knock-on effect on British interests.
This is why the House of Lords took the decision in 2014 to set up a select committee to scrutinise the Government’s policies for the High North. We set about our task by taking evidence in parliament while members visited the Yukon, Iceland, Tromsø and Svalbard.
The impetus for our enquiry was one of change. The Arctic is the region of greatest transformation on our planet – the fastest rising temperatures, melting ice, increasing mineral exploration, the start of mass tourism, and opening sea routes.
From a diplomatic point of view, Britain may still be a major player in research and an observer at the Arctic Council. However, its historic activity is at risk of being eclipsed by the welcome interest of more distant nations, not least from Asia.
As the committee undertook its  work it also became clear that the UK had wider interests in the High North: London is a global centre of business, finance and insurance; it is the headquarters of the International Maritime Organisation and OSPAR (the Convention for the Protection of the Marine Environment of the North-East Atlantic); we have a long history of polar science and expertise from the North Sea on gas exploration.
The British Government produced its own Arctic policy document in 2013. It was cautiously called a ‘policy framework’ – avoiding the word ‘strategy’ so as not to be seen as too bold. But did this reticence risk sending out a signal of indifference to the rest of the world?
That same year the Arctic Council expanded the number of its observer states with the admission of China, India, Japan, South Korea, Singapore and Italy. Instead of being one of four original observer states, the UK was now one of twelve.
Our recommendations were wide ranging:

• the UK should appoint an Arctic Ambassador to coordinate the UK’s North Polar activities and raise our northern game
• there should be a moratorium on fishing in Arctic international waters until the ocean’s ecology is far better understood
• the UK’s contribution to polar research should be increased, especially regarding permafrost thaw
• the fall in oil prices should be an opportunity to pause offshore exploration to resolve the very real environmental dangers.
• the Arctic Council should continue to receive the full support of the UK in its work as a successful regional organisation of governance
• the USA should ratify the UNCLOS treaty (the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Seas) that will determine the many territorial claims around the Pole
• the UK should work to help isolate other wider geopolitical problems. The Crimean annexation took place during the work of the committee but Arctic cooperation needs to continue despite wider tensions.

There were many other recommendations, not least supporting the robust involvement of the Indigenous peoples of the Arctic. But we also strongly recommended that the European Union should at last be given full observer status at the Arctic Council.
It could be argued that with Denmark, Sweden and Finland as full members of the Council, and seven other EU states as observers, it is hardly necessary. But the EU is a major supranational power that can act as an important coordinator of external action: it has one of the world’s largest research budgets and it is a key player in fisheries management in northern waters adjoining the Arctic. The EU has been an ‘ad hoc’ observer since 1998. The move to a permanent official role has been soured by the dispute with Canada over seal products. Now that this has been resolved, it is the EU’s robust reaction to Russia’s intervention in Ukraine that is proving to be the barrier.
There is no doubt that the EU as a fully-fledged observer would be beneficial to the Arctic’s future and strengthen the Arctic Council itself. The Arctic Council is young in terms of international organisations and has  a good track record of success. It is in the interest of all countries, including the UK, that the Council increases its authority and is successful as the Arctic undergoes continued rapid change.

This article originally appeared in The Circle, WWF’s quarterly Arctic journal, issue 01.16. See all articles here. Previous issues of The Circle can be downloaded here.

Melting sea ice is reviving the centuries-old dream of an Arctic “silk route” connecting European or North American ports to Asia. With navigating the Arctic becoming a reality, MARIA DELIGIANNI says European shipowners need more investments in infrastructure and technology. Deligianni is a Policy Advisor on Maritime Safety, Environment and Offshore at European Community Shipowners’ Associations (ECSA).
PRECAUTIONS NEED to be taken to ensure safety of life at sea and the sustainability of these highly sensitive environments is not compromised. While the International Maritime Organisation (IMO) remains the primary regulator for the shipping industry, the European Community Shipowners’ Associations (ECSA) endorses the actions taken by the European Union towards the development of a policy on Arctic issues, especially in increasing knowledge of the region and investing in research and development. The Polar Code was intensely debated by the IMO for more than four years before adoption in 2014 by its Maritime Safety Committee (MSC). From the beginning European shipowners underscored that a mandatory and uniform regulatory framework is a prerequisite to ensure maritime safety and environmental protection, as polar shipping grows in volume and diversifies in the coming years. This is the single, most expeditious solution to achieve coordination and harmonisation of national legislation.
As European Shipowners, we support that the risk-based approach followed by the Polar Code will indeed boost the level of confidence in the safety and environmental performance of shipping. As of 2017, we are set to comply with IMO requirements by carrying onboard the Polar Ship Certificate stating the adequacy of the vessel to navigate in the region and the Polar Water Operational Manual – an essential tool in evaluating the anticipated range of operating conditions and hazards to ensure the decision-making process onboard is adjusted accordingly.
The Code has been criticized for a number of omissions on issues such as heavy fuel oil use by vessels, the lack of invasive species’ protections and sufficient oil spill response requirements. We consider the Polar Code to be the first decisive step by the IMO at this stage. The importance of the Code is its mandatory nature that ensures a level playing field. However, we acknowledge that more needs to be done and anticipate amendments will follow to strengthen the current provisions.
It is unrealistic to believe that the Arctic will be immediately accessible as sea ice disappears. Firstly, an ice-free Arctic Ocean year-round is false, as sea ice will always re-form during winter and ice properties and coverage will vary greatly within the region. There are also many other challenges that shipowners encounter such as polar darkness, poor charts, lack of critical infrastructure and navigation control systems, low search-and-rescue capability, and other non-climatic factors.
Therefore, development of the appropriate regulatory framework should be accompanied by reinforced infrastructure and technology. Other critical investments include: improved navigation aids; accuracy of nautical charts; weather forecasts; monitoring of drifting ice and icing conditions as well as search and rescue infrastructure for defined incident scenarios. These are just some of the critical factors that need to be addressed in a region in which extreme weather events are routine occurrences.
Maintaining a positive reputation for operators, as the area is increasingly exploited, is also a challenge. Maritime transport and energy extraction depend on both local and global acceptance of increased industrial activity in the Arctic. Investment in relationships is imperative for local and global acceptance of increasing industrial activities in the Arctic. This confidence can be built through investments in ice research, forecasting and communications to ensure operational risks can be properly assessed and mitigated. A broad focus on knowledge and research is also crucial for increasing activities in the Arctic.
As demonstrated by the successful development of the Polar Code, IMO is the appropriate forum for developing standards for ships operating in the Arctic. It has the necessary legal and technical expertise to take full account of the interests of all maritime nations, including those with an Arctic coastline.
Discussions on an EU Policy on arctic issues are also gaining momentum. In principle, we endorse the three pillars identified by the 2012 Joint Communication Commission and High Representative of the EU for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy: support research and channel knowledge; act with responsibility; and intensify the constructive engagement and dialogue with Arctic States. We also acknowledge EU’s actions in becoming one of the key investors in the region by exploring further investment and research priorities.
The EU could play a prominent role in addressing some of these challenges through the development of satellite communication and tracking and monitoring systems to ensure safe navigation and enable search and rescue (SAR) operations. This could take place through Galileo and Copernicus, the global navigation satellite system which provides a highly accurate, global positioning service.
In addition, a highly-developed infrastructure of geographical information through the creation of a digital atlas of the Arctic should be established. Compiling geographical information and obtaining a complete picture of what is happening at a given location (maps, charts, records, etc.) is also crucial. This data should be collected, maintained and made available in the most effective manner, perhaps through the Arctic Information Center the European Commission is considering.
The EU could also develop a platform to pool data on the state of the seas in and around Europe and high-resolution sea-bed mapping. This would further assist in establishing safe transport routes in Arctic waters.
Last but not least, it is clear that future initiatives in the Arctic will necessitate an increase in maritime training capacity. Specialised courses focusing on High North/Arctic operations should be enhanced to offer relevant and qualified manpower in the offshore and maritime domain. Improved competence requirements and standards will ensure there is knowledge and understanding of Arctic conditions. The EU could play a prominent role in developing these programmes.
Shipping activities in the Arctic must take place within the framework of uniform regulatory framework and adequate infrastructure that ensures quality shipping among all operators in the region. Any maritime accident in the vulnerable Arctic is an accident that affects us all.

This article originally appeared in The Circle, WWF’s quarterly Arctic journal, issue 01.16. See all articles here. Previous issues of The Circle can be downloaded here.

GENEVIÈVE PONS is the Director of the European Policy Office of WWF.
THE ARCTIC IS STREWN with the names of Europeans drawn by the lure of trade and riches – Dutch explorer Willem Barentsz, Dane Vitus Bering, Britain’s William Baffin, for example and there are hundreds more. Close behind them came fur traders, whalers, gold-seekers and others who left a legacy of Indigenous oppression and devastating ecological impacts.

This time, the people of the Arctic are better prepared to defend their rights and interests

After a couple of centuries of relative neglect, the Arctic is once again drawing Europeans and for many of the same reasons. At the same time, the region is at the very centre of debates on climate change as it warms twice as fast as the global average and drives global impacts such as rising sea levels and melting sea ice which is opening up the Arctic Ocean and spurring renewed interest in Arctic resources and trade routes.
This time, however, the rule of international law is more entrenched in the Arctic, and the people of the Arctic are better prepared to defend their rights and interests.
As I write this, the European Commission is preparing to release a “communication” that is expected to officially set out the EU’s interests in the Arctic in the coming years. WWF provided input to this process that we hope will be reflected in this upcoming policy paper.
For example, WWF has recommended more research  to help understand and predict Arctic change, particularly regarding ecosystems, the sustainability of fisheries and the transition from fossil fuels (especially diesel) to renewables for energy production. This should go hand-in-hand with support for investments in alternative socio- economic models fostering economic diversification into sectors other than extractive industries.
The EU should also provide political support for nature conservation in the region, and for the creation and management of a pan-Arctic network of protected areas, including areas of particular ecological importance in terms of climate change resilience, communities and species conservation.
Wildlife products have long provided livelihoods for Arctic Indigenous peoples, and it is important to ensure that their use and trade is based on sustainable practices.The EU can do much to educate consumers on wildlife products, perhaps through certification schemes.
The EU should also enforce compliance of European businesses operating in the Arctic with international, EU and national regulations, as well as with Arctic-specific standards and guidelines to address marine noise, oil spill prevention, pollution, carbon intensity, and fisheries.
As well, many internationally agreed goals such as limiting global temperature rise to well below 2C, halting global biodiversity loss by 2020, and establishing marine protected areas, will benefit the Arctic region, given its unique exposure to climate change and nature degradation.
This time around, the people of the EU can explore the Arctic’s potential more ethically and sustainably than they did centuries ago. Instead of leaving their names on the map, they can leave a legacy of support for the Arctic environment, and for Arctic peoples.